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Abstract. This paper presents a new design and function allocation philosophy 
between pilots and automation that seeks to support the human in mitigating in-
nate weaknesses (e.g., memory, vigilance) while enhancing their strengths (e.g., 
adaptability, resourcefulness). In this new allocation strategy, called Synergistic 
Allocation of Flight Expertise in the Flight Deck (SAFEdeck), the automation 
and the human provide complementary support and backup for each other. Auto-
mation is designed to be compliant with the practices of Crew Resource Manage-
ment.  The human takes a more active role in the normal operation of the aircraft 
without adversely increasing workload over the current automation paradigm.  
This designed involvement encourages the pilot to be engaged and ready to re-
spond to unexpected situations. As such, the human may be less prone to error 
than the current automation paradigm. 
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1 Introduction 
The vision of a future flight deck for civilian and military aircraft is often one of no 
flight deck at all. Phrases such as ‘Increasing Automation’ and ‘Automation Autonomy’ 
dominate many research and development programs within NASA and the Department 
of Defense. The vision of uncrewed aircraft is one of increased efficiency, precision, 
and reliability and reduced costs and errors. Humans are often considered a liability to 
the system. The rationale for full automation is straightforward. Most accidents are 
found to be caused by human error. The human must be the weak link in the chain. 
Since automation has hardly ever been found at fault for causing an accident, more 
automation plus less human equals greater safety.  
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. The modern civil aircraft is highly 
automated and the human’s role has decreased substantially [1]. And yet, these aircraft 
are still involved in accidents. The fact that human errors are still named as the causes 
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of these accidents gives rise to the question: Why hasn’t the reduction in human in-
volvement in the operation of the aircraft resulted in a commensurate reduction in ac-
cidents caused by human error?  
Similar questions have been raised regarding the issue of pilot workload in the flight 
deck. Since much of what the pilot used to perform has been allocated to the automa-
tion, why isn’t there a significant decrease in the pilot’s perceived workload? This ques-
tion has been answered. Studies have shown that while the pilot’s physical workload 
decreased in highly automated aircraft, their mental workload increased.  Automation 
did not reduce pilot workload; it simply changed the nature of that workload [2, 3, 4].  
Perhaps the fact that human error and workload have not appreciably decreased in 
the modern flight deck is due, in part, to how the automation has been implemented as 
opposed to the amount of automation in the flight deck.  There has been much research 
demonstrating how humans have fared poorly with increased automation; for example, 
automation complacency, overreliance on automation, loss of situational awareness and 
spatial orientation, and skill loss. These have contributed to human errors.  
This paper presents a new flight deck design based on a function allocation approach 
called Complemation [5]. Complemation focuses on the role of the human in the flight 
deck; specifically, ‘Why must the human be in the flight deck?’ It uses automation and 
design to surround and support the human in performing that role. This is in contrast to 
substitution-based and machine-based forms of function allocation [6]. Substitution 
based function allocation considers all the tasks that have to be performed in the flight 
deck and determines whether the human or the automation can perform them better. 
The winner is given the task.  Machine-based allocation operates under the assumption 
that machines are inherently better than humans and that the design should use automa-
tion to its fullest.  In machine-based allocation schemes, the human is assigned the ‘left-
overs,’ that is, the tasks that automation cannot handle. But these tasks are usually very 
difficult and can be disparate and non-cohesive from the human’s perspective. In Com-
plemation, some tasks may be allocated to the human even though the automation may 
be able to perform some aspects of that task better than the human. Automation is used 
purposefully and deliberately as opposed to wherever it can be used.  
The flight deck design produced by this approach is called the Synergistic Allocation 
of Flight Expertise in the Flight Deck (SAFEdeck). It has many commonalities with 
current flight deck designs and concepts but there are significant differences. One big 
difference is that the flight automation is controlled using the active feedback control 
inceptors (e.g., stick and throttle) rather than using an autopilot interface on the glare 
shield and a Flight Management System (FMS) Control and Display Unit (CDU).  The 
inceptors are the only way in which the pilot can command the aircraft to move. The 
pilot is more actively involved in the progress of the flight. The automation supports 
the pilot by actively engaging and managing their attention so they do not forget to 
perform tasks and adhere to flight restrictions.  
The first section of this paper sets the stage for describing SAFEdeck by providing 
an analogy using automobile driving. The next section constitutes the bulk of the paper 
where the SAFEdeck design is described. This section also concludes with a summary 
of results from an experiment that investigated this instantiation. The last section in-
cludes suggestions for future work and for implementation of the function allocation 
strategy.  
2 An automobile analogy 
Like aircraft operations, the SAFEdeck concept is extremely complex and detailed. As 
such, it is impossible to fully describe the concept in a paper such as this. In order to 
aid the reader in understanding SAFEdeck, an analogy may be beneficial. The analogy 
is based on automobile driving using advanced technology.  
The Drive. A driver wants to travel from New York City to Orlando, Florida. The first 
step is to create a route using a route planner (e.g., Goggle Maps™, Garmin™, Tom 
Tom™). The planner uses published highway and roadway data to create the route. The 
driver can modify this route as needed. The route is loaded into the automobile’s navi-
gation system.  The driver then begins the trip. Navigation information is provided on 
the driver’s heads up display, as well as a top-down map display. Both displays depict 
the roadways and highways (even if they are not on the planned route.)  
The driver’s first goal is to get to the interstate. There are several predetermined 
courses to get from the driver’s house to the interstate (each course is a different pack-
aged or chunked path out of the city). The driver turns the car onto one of these courses. 
The automation recognizes this as a predetermined route and offers the driver the option 
to drive this route. The driver accepts and engages the automation with a trigger switch 
on the steering wheel. From that point, the automation will drive the car. The driver can 
take hands off the wheel and gas pedal.  
While still in the city, a van breaks down in the road in front of the car. The automa-
tion interprets this as a traffic backup and waits. The driver sees that it is not a traffic 
backup and disconnects the automation. The driver puts on the turn signal to inform 
other drivers and the automation that they want to drive into the oncoming traffic lane 
to go around the van. The automation’s monitoring looks for cars approaching from 
either direction and gives the driver a green indicator when it is safe to do so. The driver 
drives the car around the van and returns to the road. The automation asks if the driver 
wishes to resume the departure from the city to the interstate, the driver says yes, pulls 
the trigger and the automation resumes driving the car to the interstate.  
As the car approaches the interstate, it informs the driver that the entrance is ahead. 
It is the driver’s responsibility to disengage the automation and manually drive the car 
onto the interstate. Once on the interstate, the driver can turn complete control back 
over to the automation. If the driver wishes to go faster, they accelerate to the new speed 
and couple to that speed. When the car approaches a change in interstates (e.g., leaving 
I-95 to get on I-495), the automation notifies the driver that the ramp is coming up. The 
driver then disconnects the automation and merges on to the new interstate and then 
reconnects the automation. If the driver fails to disconnect and take the exit. The auto-
mation will provide louder and more alarming alerts. The car will remain on the inter-
state. However the warnings will continue until the driver actively silences them.  
If the driver wishes to stop for the night at a hotel, the driver can select the hotel on 
the map display.  The automation will alert the driver when the car is approaching the 
exit ramp. Again, the driver manually takes control and transitions to the local road. If 
the hotel is much farther down the road, the driver can tell the automation to follow the 
road and provide reminders when approaching the point where they need to leave the 
road.  
If the driver decides to simply drive around the countryside the next morning before 
returning to the interstate, the driver can drive on a road and then have the automation 
drive the car on that road. As the car approaches intersections, the automation alerts the 
driver of the intersection but nothing more. If the car comes to a T in the road where 
the driver must make a decision, the automation notifies the driver. If the car stops and 
the driver still has not intervened, the automation will sound the warning. If there is 
traffic behind the car, the automation will decide to turn one way or the other (to avoid 
obstructing traffic) but will pull over when able. 
The Automation. Note that the car is not entirely self-driving. The driver does not enter 
a destination and then allow the car to independently drive all the way there. The car 
has limited automation, but that automation is extremely robust. The automation is re-
sponsible for all monitoring and for reminding the driver to make major transitions 
(e.g., home to city-exit course, city-exit course to interstate, interstate to interstate). But 
the driver must return to manual control to make those transitions. The automation will 
never willingly disconnect without the driver’s approval.  The automation can be over-
ridden at any point.  
The automation is aware of the road structure, the speed limits, facilities along the 
way, the weather conditions, and the plan. It is aware of its immediate surroundings 
(e.g., roads, other traffic, pedestrians and cyclists). It monitors road conditions. It is also 
aware of driver intervention and what the driver is doing (with regard to driving) even 
when the automation is not controlling the car. The logic of the automation has no high 
level reasoning skills and is entirely deterministic.  
The Human. The human driver has the role of high level decision maker. If the driver 
is not situationally aware, they cannot perform this role and long durations of highly 
reliable automation can lead to complacency and distractibility. So the driver is called 
upon to periodically be part of the mission by making decisions at important junctures 
in the trip.  It is unwise to expect that the driver will be paying attention otherwise.  
The driver is also responsible for intervening in cases of automation failure or ina-
bility to appropriately perform. There may be cases where the automation doesn’t know 
what to do or does not have authority. In these cases, the driver must return to manual 
control. If the driver has little or no regular experience with manual driving, there may 
be skill loss after a time. By requiring the driver to not only be involved in decision 
making at important junctures in the mission but also to manually drive, skill loss can 
be greatly reduced. Turns and decision points are more instructive in car handling skills 
than manual driving on a long stretch of highway.  
 
3 Synergistic Allocation of Flight Expertise in the Flight Deck 
(SAFEdeck) 
The SAFEdeck approach expands on the automobile system described above and ap-
plies it to aviation. The street/highway map is replaced with High and Low Altitude 
charts, Arrival, Departure, Approach and other terminal area charts and procedures. 
Nearly all of that information is contained in modern FMSs. The steering wheel is re-
placed by the active inceptors for the control surfaces and the gas pedal is replaced by 
an active throttle.  The pilot has the role of high-level decision maker, risk manager and 
backup for the automation. Unlike today’s aircraft, the entire mission may be planned, 
but execution of that mission requires human intervention at critical junctures. Unlike 
today’s aircraft where there are three ways to control the aircraft (stick and throttle, 
autopilot/mode control panel (MCP), and FMS), there is only one way to control the 
aircraft and the automation – the active stick and throttle.  
SAFEdeck is based on several design concepts, H-mode [7], the Naturalistic Flight 
Deck [8], and the Haptic Flight Control System [9].  The philosophy behind this ap-
proach is that one of the human’s primary roles is to step in and deal with emergencies, 
non-normals, and highly complex or unanticipated situations. In some cases they must 
act as a backup for the automation or other resources. One of the goals of the design is 
to keep the pilot in the proper condition to perform these duties. To do this, SAFEdeck 
seeks to actively engage the pilot in the mission to maintain their situation awareness. 
This engagement will take the form of manually flying the aircraft at certain times in 
order to maintain skill level. In addition, the automation will conform to standard Crew 
Resource Management [10] principles as if it were another crew member.  Finally, it is 
expected that the human will have deficiencies that lead to errors and the design must 
accommodate these deficiencies.  
The SAFEdeck concept will be described by first defining the hardware components 
required, then the flight management functions and other functions critical to the con-
cept. Finally, the results of an evaluation experiment will be briefly described. 
3.1 SAFEdeck Hardware Components 
There are many ways in which the SAFEdeck design can be implemented and so some 
of these descriptions will be deliberately vague. But the basic components either exist 
or are easily implemented in flight decks today. In many ways, the SAFEdeck flight 
deck will look very similar to modern flight decks. There are no dramatically new tech-
nology or display requirements. The main difference is how the automation and instru-
mentation is implemented, rather than the automation and instrumentation itself.  
Active Inceptors. The two primary inceptors – the stick (or wheel and column) and the 
throttle – are active force-feedback inceptors. They are capable of transmitting haptic 
cues (such as pulses and vibrations) and are able to produce artificial force shaping to 
allow for resistance to envelope departures, detents, and other feedback signals. One 
force shaping feature is to allow virtual slots/tracks (similar to the slots/tracks in a stand-
ard transmission gear shifter pattern.) Each inceptor has at least three switches: A trig-
ger for engaging the automation, a button for disengaging the automation, and a selec-
tion device (e.g., thumb wheel, hat-switch). The inceptor position always corresponds 
to the actual commands given to the control surfaces and engines.  
Navigation Display.  A large, easily accessible, high definition map display that can 
not only show the path that the aircraft is flying and waypoints, but also existing route 
structure and available options. The map should have a top-down perspective and a 
vertical perspective. Touch or cursor control will likely be a requirement. The Naviga-
tion Display is a primary instrument for normal flight and will likely be consulted as 
often as the Primary Flight Display.  
Primary Flight Display.  This display contains the usual symbology found on modern 
primary flight displays. In addition a perspective view is presented behind the symbol-
ogy. On this perspective view, not only is the current path portrayed in something like 
a highway in the sky, but also existing route structure. Waypoints in the form of ‘way-
poles’ are also presented. Waypoles are vertical representations of waypoints. These 
waypoles may be flat earth representations if they are significantly far away.  
Target Control Panel.  Similar in many respects to modern autoflight interfaces (e.g., 
Mode Control Panels), the Target Control Panel allows the pilot to dial in specific head-
ings, altitudes, airspeeds, and ascent/descent profiles. The major difference is that ma-
nipulating these parameters will not affect the aircraft’s flight path. They merely create 
targets for the pilot to aim at / fly to. There may be additional parameter controls such 
as time of arrival or latitude/longitude. 
Flight Planner. The Flight Planner is a separate device that is used to create plans, 
create what-if and alternate scenarios, and perhaps simulate the mission in fast time. 
The Flight Planner may be a portable device that communicates with the automation so 
that the pilot can make plans prior to flight or can use it as a tablet in flight, but this is 
not required. Ideally, the Navigation Display should not be used for the Flight Planner. 
The Navigation Display should always present real-time tactical information and it 
should not have additional clutter involved with the Flight Planner interface needs. 
3.2  SAFEdeck Flight Management Functions 
There are five basic Flight Management Functions in the SAFEdeck concept: Envelope 
Protection, Collision/Danger Avoidance, Self Preservation, Precision Assistance, and 
Active Flight Control.  The first three are always on, however they can be overridden 
by the pilot. The last two assist the pilot in short-term, tactical maneuvers and control 
the aircraft over longer periods of time to manage workload and improve efficiency. 
They are used at the pilot’s discretion.    
Envelope Protection. This function impedes the ability to stall, overspeed, underspeed 
or barrel-roll the aircraft. When the aircraft is approaching one of these states, the pilot 
is alerted prior to this protection engaging. Before the aircraft actually enters one of 
these states, the inceptor will exert an artificial force that counteracts the condition. If 
the pilot does not intervene, this force will automatically return the aircraft to a safe 
orientation. The pilot can overpower this force and use the full capabilities of the air-
craft. If the pilot releases the inceptor, the automation will seek to stabilize the aircraft 
Collision/Danger Avoidance.  This function serves to automatically avoid dangers 
such as other aircraft, severe weather, terrain, or restricted airspace. The pilot will be 
alerted as soon as possible so that they can avoid the danger themselves as they see fit.  
If the aircraft continues to advance towards the danger, the automation will increase the 
level of alert and it will provide artificial counter pressure on the inceptor to move away 
from the danger. Again, the pilot can override this feature.  
Self Preservation.  This function is used when the pilot is not responding due to inca-
pacitation or impairment. If the pilot has not responded to an alert or failed to take 
control of the aircraft when the automation requests it, the automation will enter into 
self-preservation mode. In this mode, the automation emits an emergency transponder 
signal, and air traffic control (ATC) and all aircraft in the area are given notice that the 
automation is taking control of the aircraft on its own. The automation will then plan a 
route to the nearest acceptable airport and proceed to perform an automated emergency 
landing. ATC and the other aircraft are responsible for clearing the way for this aircraft 
as they would in any emergency.  
As this is one of the few times the automation will make a mode change on its own 
and because it takes control away from the pilot, every effort will be made to ensure 
that the pilot can override this mode. It may be that the automation’s first task is to 
descend to a breathable altitude in case the pilot is hypoxic. Additional safeguards may 
be necessary for this mode such as concurrence by ATC.  
Precision Assistance.  There are three aspects of this function. They may be thought 
of as a ‘snap-to’ feature, a ‘restrict axis’ feature, and a ‘reset’ feature.  
Snap-To. If the aircraft is approaching a target (such as a heading that has been selected 
on the target control panel, or a published flight path or waypoint), and the pilot per-
forms an action that appears to be trying to lock on to that target, the automation will 
home in on it so that the pilot does not have to struggle to make the precise corrections. 
The automation will stabilize on that target. It is important to note that the automation 
will not hold that target under precision assistance. If the pilot wants to hold to that 
target, they must use active flight control.  
Restrict Axis. Often the pilot may wish to make a turn without changing altitude or may 
want to make an altitude change while staying on the lateral route (e.g., a jetway).  The 
stick inceptor has a slight artificial force shaping in the form of two virtual slots forming 
a cross with the center of the cross located at the current position. If the pilot pulls 
directly back on the stick, they can feel the vertical slot created by the artificial force 
shaping. This will restrict movements to the vertical dimension only and will hold the 
lateral path constant. Likewise, if the pilot moves the stick to the left into horizontal 
slot, only lateral changes are made and the aircraft remains at the same altitude. It is 
important to note (yet difficult to describe) that the force shaping conforms to the actual 
pattern that would be required to maintain either axis. For example, when turning to the 
left, one might have to raise the nose slightly (pulling back on the stick) to maintain 
altitude.  The slot will then bend slightly back to add this correction. This is due to a 
SAFEdeck constraint that the stick position always reflects what is happening in the 
aircraft. By shaping the alleyway to reflect real flight control corrections, the pilot al-
ways feels what should be done to maintain that axis. That way, if the precision assis-
tance automation fails, the pilot will still be making the same stick movements that 
would be made by the automation. The pilot will never have to move the stick in one 
manner while the automation is active and another manner while the automation is dis-
engaged.  
Reset. This function is used to return the aircraft to a stabilized straight and level con-
figuration. If the pilot finds themselves losing control of the aircraft, the pilot can call 
upon this function to have the automation right the aircraft. The pilot would use this 
feature if they become spatially disorientated. One possible implementation for this 
feature would be for the pilot to press and continue to hold the trigger on the stick. This 
appears congruent with the expected human physical response to disorientation – to 
grip the inceptor tightly. When in the reset mode, the stick inputs of the pilot are ig-
nored1. 
Active Flight Control. In the automobile analogy offered in Section 2, the automation 
would couple to a road or highway and follow it without driver intervention. The 
SAFEdeck equivalent of this would be to couple to a jetway. The pilot would fly to the 
jetway, the automation would recognize it as something to follow, and the pilot would 
tell the automation to follow it. The airspace system is significantly more complicated 
than a country’s road and highway system.  SAFEdeck uses a category of objects called 
behaviors to handle the diversity of air travel. A jetway is a behavior. A holding pattern 
is a behavior. An approach is a behavior. A performance climb is a behavior. A takeoff 
is a behavior. A go-around is a behavior.  A heading hold is a behavior. Behaviors are 
actions or sets of actions that the automation can perform autonomously. Behaviors can 
be published (e.g., jetways, approaches) or they can be created (e.g., heading hold, hold-
ing pattern, performance climb).  In the automobile analogy above, the predetermined 
route out of the city would be a single behavior and is equivalent to a standard instru-
ment departure from an airport.) Behaviors are generally geographically- based and 
have a start and an end – however they do not have to be (e.g., holding patterns can 
occur anywhere above a certain altitude and continue until the pilot decides to leave the 
pattern). The pilot can join a behavior at any point along its three dimensional path.  
To couple to any behavior, the pilot performs the following: 
 Fly the aircraft to the behavior and align it to the behavior 
 Select the behavior (there may be more than one available at that location) 
 Pull the trigger and engage the automation 
Align, Select, Trigger is all the pilot has to remember to couple to a behavior.  Pre-
cision assistance aids the pilot in aligning the aircraft to the behavior. In some cases it 
may be possible to create a behavior when you select it. For example, when the pilot 
points the aircraft at a waypoint, the automation gives the pilot the option to create a 
‘go-to’ behavior to that waypoint. Pulling the trigger creates that behavior and couples 
the automation to it.  
Disengaging the Automation. A dedicated button on the inceptors is used to disengage 
the automation. This is the preferred method. When the button is used to disengage an 
audible notification is given that a normal disengagement has taken place. Pressing the 
disengage button is the equivalent of telling the automation, “I have control of the air-
plane.” The audible notification is the automation’s way of saying that it concurs. An-
other way to disengage the automation is by force. If the pilot grabs the stick and pro-
vides a reasonable amount of pressure, the automation will disconnect and a caution 
alert will sound. This indicates that the automation was disengaged in a non-normal 
manner. Unless there is a failure, the automation will not automatically disengage. Fol-
lowing good Crew Resource Management [10] principles, it will not relinquish control 
until there is someone to receive it, thus ensuring that someone always has control of 
the aircraft.  
                                                          
1 This is one of the few exceptions where the stick position may not agree with the actual control 
surface commands.  
Modifying a behavior. It is common for an aircraft to change altitude on a route due to 
weather or traffic. In such cases, the Restrict Axis precision assistance is used. Moving 
the stick either directly backwards or directly forwards so that it ‘slides’ into the artifi-
cial force alleyway will cause the automation to stay on the current lateral track of the 
behavior. Dialing an altitude into the Target Control Panel will create an altitude target. 
When the aircraft is approaching this altitude, the pilot receives a notification that it 
will be time to level off. When the pilot levels off near that altitude, the Snap-To preci-
sion assistance will home in on that altitude2.   
At the Behavior’s end. If the aircraft comes to the end of the behavior and the pilot has 
not transitioned to a new behavior or disconnected the automation, the automation will 
go into a safe state.  A safe state varies depending on the type of behavior and if there 
is a plan in the system.  At the end of an airway behavior, if there is a planned transition 
to another airway and the pilot has done nothing, the automation will make that transi-
tion on its own. However, this will constitute a warning that requires significant pilot 
input to silence. The significant input is to keep the pilot from becoming reliant on this 
feature (e.g., not bothering to disconnect, align, select, trigger because the automation 
will do it for them).  If the pilot does not respond for the next behavior transition listed 
in the plan, the self-preservation mechanisms described above will engage. If there is 
no planned transition but there are published behaviors connected to the end of the cur-
rent behavior, the automation will make an educated guess and pick one. If there are no 
planned or published transitions, the automation will transition to an altitude/heading 
hold behavior.  
3.3 SAFEdeck Notification and Alerting Functions 
SAFEdeck requires that the pilot must have a more interactive role in flying the aircraft 
and this includes making time- and position-critical inputs such as leveling off at the 
proper altitude. However vigilance and prospective memory (i.e., remembering to do 
something) are weak traits in human behavior [11].  It is vitally important that the 
SAFEdeck design includes a robust notification system that will ensure that the pilot 
remembers to intervene. Fortunately, vigilance and prospective memory are automa-
tion’s strong suits. The SAFEdeck automation can provide notifications for: 
 A behavior transition or parameter target is coming up (allowing the pilot to 
stop what they are doing and get back into the loop),   
 It is time to make the behavior transition (e.g., disconnect, align, select, trig-
ger), 
 The pilot has failed to make the behavior transition, or 
 The behavior has ended and the automation has gone into a safe state 
These notifications increase in urgency, saliency, and alert level (Advisory, Caution, 
Warning).  The goal is that the pilot will respond to the first two notifications in order 
to avoid the last two alerts.  
                                                          
2 There is more detail to correctly achieving this procedure.  
3.4 SAFEdeck Filtering and Decluttering Functions 
As mentioned previously, all published behaviors are presented on the navigation dis-
play. This is important because it allows the pilot to easily transition to an unplanned 
change/behavior by essentially flying to it and coupling the automation to the behavior 
instead of having to program the changes in a flight management system. However, 
there are far too many published airways, waypoints, arrivals, departures, and other 
procedures to present all of them on the navigation display. Another critical element of 
the SAFEdeck design is robust and efficient contextual behavior filtering and display 
decluttering. These functions would use context such as aircraft equipage, current plan, 
current altitude, phase of flight, direction, range, current airport information, and per-
haps probability to filter out a significant amount of choices. Of course, the pilot should 
be able to select the filtering/decluttering methods so as to see more or fewer choices.  
3.5 Experiment Results 
The SAFEdeck concept increases the amount of physical workload on the pilot by 
bringing them back into the loop at junctures in the mission. The primary controls are 
now all routed through the ‘stick and throttle’ inceptors. These two factors have led to 
speculation that this is a step backwards to the flight decks of old rather than a step 
forward into the future. A part-task simulator study was performed to assess impact of 
the SAFEdeck concept on workload when compared to manual flying and fully auto-
mated flying. Additionally, the impacts on situational awareness, primary and second-
ary task performance, and subject preferences were assessed [12, 13].  
Twenty-four high-time, non-instrument-rated pilots planned and flew four different 
flights in a fictitious airspace using a moderate-fidelity, part-task simulation.  Each of 
the four runs was approximately one hour long. Three different flight control paradigms 
were tested: Manual Control (MC), Full Automation (FA) – a path-coupled automatic 
control typical of modern commercial aircraft, and a simplified version of the 
SAFEdeck concept. Subjects were required to make both tactical and strategic flight 
changes as well as perform two secondary tasks (target recognition and numeric calcu-
lation). An automation failure was introduced in the FA and the SAFEdeck conditions 
and the time to detect the failure was measured. Workload was measured using the 
NASA-TLX [14]. Situational awareness was measured using the SAGAT [15] protocol 
and subjective responses.  
To summarize the statistically significant findings: 1) the SAFEdeck condition re-
duced Mental Demand and Effort when compared to the MC condition; 2) subjects 
detected a failure of the automation in the SAFEdeck condition sooner than they de-
tected it in the FA condition; and 3) subjects preferred the SAFEdeck condition over 
both the FA and the MC conditions when considering just flying the aircraft and when 
considering flying the aircraft with secondary tasks. 
The statistically significant results themselves are encouraging and they reinforce 
the claims of increased situation awareness, reduced workload, and high subject pref-
erence when using the SAFEdeck concept. While many of the results were not statisti-
cally significant, they all favored the SAFEdeck concept over the other two.  
4 Summary 
SAFEdeck has six major features that make it unique from current automation strategies 
in the flight deck. The first combats mode confusion and skill loss and supports graceful 
degradation. SAFEdeck uses the manual control inceptors to manage and direct the au-
tomation rather than having the pilot use three uniquely different interfaces (the control 
inceptors, the autopilot (mode control panel) and the flight management system inter-
face. The second feature addresses mode confusion and complacency while improving 
situational awareness. The pilot is involved in all major trajectory changes such as ma-
jor heading and altitude changes. The third feature combats typical human errors that 
stem from forgetfulness. SAFEdeck takes advantage of automation’s memory capacity 
and retrieval (retrospective, prospective, declarative, and procedural) to backup the pi-
lot. A fourth feature addresses mode confusion as well as allowing more fluid tactical 
trajectory management support. It is the use of enhanced graphics on both the primary 
flight display and the map display that show all flight path options that are available 
and appropriate to the pilot.  The fifth feature is the use of the automation as backup for 
human error, and the pilot as backup for the automation. This feature addresses prob-
lems of complacency and other types of human error. Finally, complacency and fatigue 
are addressed by imbuing the automation with ‘self preservation’ features that make it 
‘resistant but not insubordinate’ to making blunders such as flight into terrain or con-
tinuing an unstable approach below a safe altitude.  
SAFEdeck does not sacrifice efficiency or capability. The human automation team 
is as efficient and precise as today’s flight management system/autopilot combination. 
All functions performed in the current automation scheme can be performed using the 
new paradigm.  But it is much more natural and simplified to perform those functions 
using the SAFEdeck design approach. The SAFEdeck design can be implemented using 
today’s technology and does not rely on advances in artificial intelligence, access to big 
data, or changes in the airspace system.  
The next steps in research are to fully implement the SAFEdeck design and then 
perform usability studies on the design using pilots and non-pilots. 
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